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An Experimental Market for Public 
Goods: The PBS Station Program 
Cooperative 
By JoHN A. FEREJOHN AND RoGER G. NoLL* 
Beginning with the 1974-75 season, 
the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) 
undertook a three-year experiment to de­
centralize through a market process the 
selection of programs to be broadcast over 
the national noncommercial television net­
work. The experimental market, called 
the Station Program Cooperative (SPC), 
enables each of the approximately 150 
participating stations to "vote with dol­
lars" for the programs they prefer, based 
on information about the subject matter, 
quality and costs of the alternatives. 
The SPC had two purposes. The first 
was to determine whether a decentralized 
market mechanism for acquiring national 
programming can be established that, first, 
has a reasonable cost and, second, retains 
the basic features of a network. A net­
work is a means of centralizing the acqui­
sition, transmission and promotion of 
programming. Although the advantages of 
networking are several, probably the most 
important is that it saves substantial 
transactions cost in comparison to the two 
other alternatives: syndication (in which 
each station negotiates for nationally 
distributed programs with the owner of 
the rights to the program) and localism 
(in which each station produces its own 
programming). (See Bruce Owen, Jack 
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The second purpose of the SPC is to 
determine its impact upon the types of 
programs that are broadcast. Centralized 
programming authorities such as the pres­
ent commercial networks and the Cor­
poration for Public Broadcasting, because 
they are few in number, are relatively 
easy targets for political pressure with 
respect to program content, may at least 
tacitly collude in programming decisions, 
and in any event, have limited experience 
concerning the nature of the demand for 
programs in all markets in the network 
system. (See Noll, Merton Peck and John 
McGowan, Ch. 8.) Because of the cost 
advantages of networking and the tech­
nical barriers to entry of new networks, 
in principle a network can produce an 
inefficient programming mix and still meet 
minimum standards of profitability or, in 
the case of the noncommercial sector, 
public aq:eptability. Concomitantly, sta­
tion managers may be too unsophisticated 
about judging programming quality and 
sensing the structure of demand in the 
local market to select programming that, 
in benefit-cost terms, is "better" than that 
selected by a centralized decision maker. 
While direct evidence on which system 
works better is not possible to acquire, 
two useful questions can be an�wered, at 
least in principle: ( 1) Do the SPC and 
centralized decision making lead to the 
selection of different programs, and if so, 
is that difference systemmatic? and ( 2) 
Which system produces higher audience 
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rati_ngs and/ or greater total revenues 
(private contributions plus government 
appropriations) for the noncommercial 
television network? This paper does not 
address these issues. (See Natan Katzman 
and Noll.) That research is still underway. 
Though unintentional, the SPC experi­
ment has a third, more' general use. The 
SPC is a test of a novel mechanism for 
public decision making about a particular 
class of public goods, specifically those for 
which binary (all or nothing) exclusion is 
possible. 
The purpose of this paper is to make 
the connection between the SPC and the 
theory of public goods, and to draw some 
preliminary conclusions about the work­
ability of this kind of artificial market. It 
is, therefore, addressed to the first and 
third issues. 
A television broadcast is a public good 
in that the cost of transmitting the pro­
gram within a given geographical area is 
independent of the number of television 
sets that are tuned to it. So, too, is the 
program a public good as far as each 
station is concerned. Excluding rents 
arising from differing popularities of pro­
grams, the costs of a program are inde­
pendent of the number of stations over 
which it is broadcast. Even national net­
work distribution costs are, in most 
instances, independent of the number of 
stations receiving the program. Nearly all · 
programs distributed by networks are 
carried over the national telecommuni­
cations system. If the program is distrib­
uted from coast to coast, the transmission 
costs are only slightly dependent on the 
number of intermediate points at which 
the program is received and broadcast. 
As the distribution of television programs 
moves to satellite transmission, national 
interconnection costs will become totally 
independent of the number of stations in 
the network. 
Nevertheless, exclusion of stations from 
use of a particular program is also essen­
tially costless. In both the commercial and 
noncommercial systems, few stations 
accept ("clear") all network programs. 
One way to view the process by which 
stations make programming decisions is 
that each station has a preference order­
ing over all available programming possi­
bilities and selects the most preferred 
feasible set of programs, given its budget 
and the costs of the alternatives. Since 
programs are public goods, these decisions 
have external effects; namely, if a pro­
gram is selected by one more station, costs 
per station decline, and hence from the 
vantage point of other stations some 
programming alternatives involving this 
program that dominate a previously 
selected alternative may become feasible. 
I. The Mechanics of the SPC 
The heart of the SPC is a: mechanism 
for calculating the price of each program 
for each station that broadcasts it. These 
prices are determined through a sequential 
process in which a series of trial price 
vectors are proposed, responded to, 
checked for acceptability with program 
producers, and, if they generate too little 
or too much revenue, updated. 
The first stage of the SPC is the dis­
semination of program proposals. Program 
producers-primarily stations, but also 
some independents such as the Childrens 
Television Workshop ("Sesame Street") 
-provide descriptions of proposed pro­
grams (series or special events), prices, 
and in many cases pilots. The form of the 
final proposal is usually negotiated with 
PBS, which among other things, tries to • 
keep program prices roughly in line with 
production costs. In each of the first 
three years of the SPC, about 250 pro· 
grams were proposed. 
The second stage of the SPC culls the 
list of proposed programs in the following 
manner. On the basis of the final pro· 
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posals, stations are asked to assign 
''priorities" to each program, which 
amounts to rating the programs on a 
scale of one to five (five is best) . The sum 
of the ratings for each program is calcu­
lated, and the programs are rank-ordered 
according to their scores. Programs rank­
ing in the top third, plus a few others 
which PBS believes deserve special con­
sideration (their classifications show high 
variance, or additional information about 
the program will become available and 
might change scores), are then allowed to 
enter the market phase of the selection 
process. This process served to cull. the 
list of contenders to 93 in the first year 
(SPC I), and 136 in the second (SPC II) .  
Next, the market phase of the SPC is 
begun. Its main feature is an algorithm for 
calculating the program prices facing each 
station. The formula for calculating the 
price Pu of program j to station i is: 
P;j =Ci .8 ----. + .2---.T-
( 
Bi N; ) 
L Bk L i\k 
where 
kESi kESi 
Ci = the cost of program j 
Bk = the programming budget of sta­
tion k 
Nk = the population of the area served 
by station k 
sj = the set of indexes of stations that 
have agreed to purchase pro­
gram j. 
Obviously, prices and the identity of pur­
chasing stations are interdependent. In 
the SPC, the initial price calculations are 
based upon the assumption that each pro­
gram is selected by stations representing 
80 percent of the combined budget and 
total audience of the entire public tele­
vision system. In subsequent rounds, 
prices are calculated on the basis of the 
budgets and populations of the stations 
selecting the program in the previous 
round. Once the market has eliminated all 
but a few more programs than are likely 
to be purchased, the SPC manager 
announces that in subsequent rounds sta­
tions will be required to continue selecting 
a program that they selected in the 
previous round if the price does not 
increase. The market process continues 
until all programs either generate revenues 
acceptable to the producer of the program,· 
receive no votes from other than the pro­
ducing stations at prices based upon 
selections made in the previous round, or 
are withdrawn from consideration by the 
producer .1 Then a final "late purchase" 
round takes place in which each station 
can select additional programs from the 
list of purchased prograins. Stations even­
tually purchased 2 5 programs in SPC I 
and 38 in SPC II, each station buying 
about 20 in the first and 30 in the second. 
The costs of programs are only upper 
bounds on the amount of revenue pro­
ducers eventually receive from the SPC. 
At any phase of the market process, a pro­
ducer may guarantee that the current 
price vector for his program will not rise 
-that is, that the producer will absorb 
the shortfall in revenues in relation to the 
listed total cost. Since many of the pro­
grams entered in the SPC will be produced 
in any event. for local or regional audi­
ences, any revenue the producer receives 
from the national market is a net gain. 
Similarly, coalitions of buyers are per­
mitted to guarantee the stability of cur­
rent prices by agreeing to make up the 
difference between revenues and costs. 
II. The Economics of the SPC 
The appropriate theoretical framework 
for analyzing the properties of the SPC 
is the extension of general equilibrium 
' The purchase rounds are conducted through a 
nationwide computer network. Each station manager 
sits at his teletypewriter, receives. messages about the 
progress of the SPC (including price updates), and 
each round enters his selections. 
---
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theory that includes pricing of public 
goods. Models of optimal choice of poli­
tical jurisdiction, the theory of clubs 
without congestion, and Lindahl pricing 
of public goods are obvious examples. (See 
James Buchanan, Bryan Ellickson, Dun­
can Foley, Eric Lindahl, R. W. Rosen­
thal and Paul A. Samuelson). In a market 
with p programs, a particular pattern of 
program selection and rejection can be 
represented by a p-dimensional vector in 
which the elements are either zero or one 
according to whether a program was re­
jected or selected by the station. A family 
of zr such vectors describes all possible 
decisions by a station, and presumably a 
station is able to generate a transitive 
weak ordering over these vectors that 
reflects its programming preferences. The 
problem faced by a station is to pick the 
highest-ranking selection vector-e.g., a 
vertex on the n-dimensional unit square­
that is feasible, given its budget and the 
prices of the programs. 
Each program producer seeks to maxi­
mize the revenue it derives from a pro­
gram, subject to two constraints: the 
revenue received through the SPC must 
cover the incremental cost of allowing 
the program to become national, and it 
must not exceed the maximum allowable 
costs negotiated with PBS, which are 
intended to be approximately total produc­
tion costs. The minimum and maximum 
prices are identical for programs that will 
be produced only for national distribution 
unless the producer can find other sources 
of financial support, is willing to take a 
loss, or is a station that values the program 
idea sufficiently highly that it is willing 
to pay more than its share of the costs to 
guarantee its production. 
The SPC is a process of generating for 
each station a price vector and a vector 
of selections and for programs a cost 
vector that constitute a stable equilibrium 
in the feasible production and budget sets. 
This algorithm has two features: an 
initialization procedure that generates the 
first trial set of prices and an updating 
procedure that changes prices until a 
stable equilibrium is found. 
From a theoretical standpoint, it is a 
miracle that the process works. One source 
of difficulty is that the production set is 
not convex. The space in which programs 
are located is of an unknown number of 
dimensions of program characteristics. 
Past research has been notably unsuc­
cessful in defining these dimensions in an 
empirically useful way (see Edward 
Greenberg and Harold Barnett), but as 
a working hypothesis a program can be 
thought of as a particular combination of 
production talents, production quality 
(e.g. , the average number of "takes" per 
printed scene, the number of scenes filmed 
on location, etc. ), and subject matter. 
Each program proposal in the SPC is, to 
all practical purposes, a single point in 
this space-not a ray, but a point­
because essentially no variance is possible 
during the operation of the SPC in any 
of the relevant dimensions, including the 
number of units of the program to be sold. 
As a result, linear combinations of pro­
grams cannot be formed to arrive at 
locations in program-characteristics space 
that are between the program points. 
Consequently, even if at all factor prices 
one unit of a particular program would 
never be selected in market competition 
with one unit of each of the other pro­
grams, it may still be selected in the SPC 
since the combinations of other programs 
that strictly Pareto dominate it cannot 
generally be formed. 
The first two SPCs had another poten­
tial problem arising from the initialization 
procedure. Because the initial price vector 
was calculated from grossly unrealistic 
assumptions about the number of stations 
that would select each program, the station 
selection vectors they called forth were 
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necessarily outside the system's feasible 
set. In SPC I second round prices aver­
aged nearly four times first-round prices! 
This kind of initialization causes a mas­
sive reduction in the number of program 
selections per station in the first few 
rounds. If initial selection vectors are 
sufficiently diverse that few programs 
appear clearly out of the running in the 
initial stages, stations will not quickly 
concentrate votes on a relatively few 
popular offerings, and so for nearly all 
programs prices will continue to rise 
through the first few rounds. If prefer­
ences are sufficiently diverse and the 
number of programs large enough com­
pared to the number of stations, the 
process might not converge to the feasible 
set. One can imagine a desperate round in 
which each station, facing astronomical 
prices, picks exactly one program, all 
stations pick a different program and no 
program can cover costs on the budget 
of a single station. 
Theoretically, whether initialization and 
updating procedures for the SPC 'can be 
derived that reach a stable equilibrium is 
as yet unanswered. Our conjecture is that 
they can, particularly if the procedures 
constitute an improvement algorithm 
rather than a search for the feasible set 
from outside it. 
The third SPC will try a new initializa­
tion procedure. Instead of calling out a 
selection vector and observing a budget­
breaking consequence, each station will 
provide the SPC with a total expenditure 
limit and a preference ordering of the pro­
grams. The SPC will then calculate new 
prices based on these preferences and tell 
each station how far down its preference 
ordering it can go, given its budget con­
straint. For the first round, preference 
ordering will not be based on an explicit 
price formula as stations will draw their 
own inferences fro.m program cost infor­
mation. In subsequent rounds, the same 
price updating procedure used in the other 
SPCs will be used. The basic idea is first 
to find a point on the boundary of the 
feasible set, and then move along the 
boundary until an equilibrium is reached. 
The main difficulty with the procedure is 
finding a nontrivial initial feasible solution. 
III. The Results of the First Two SPCs 
The SPC results of interest here relate 
to the convergence properties of the sys­
tem; we will not investigate the issues 
related to the types of programs the 
system selected. 
In both of the first two SPC experi­
ments, the market phase of the selection 
process was allowed to run for twelve 
rounds. SPC I had two-thirds as many 
programs from which . to choose, and 
eventually purchased two-thirds as many 
programs, as SPC II. 
By round 6 in SPC I and round 8 in 
SPC II, the programs that were purchased 
had all but been determined. ln SPC I, 
the three programs still in the market 
during round 6 that were subsequently 
eliminated received support from 3, 5 and 
8 stations, respectively, while the three 
·· lowest numbers of supporting stations for 
programs that were eventually purchased 
were 19, 21 and 34. Nineteen of the 25 
programs that were eventually purchased 
were, by round 6, receiving support from 
over half of the stations ( 7 5). 
In round 8 of SPC II, the six programs 
that were eventually dropped received 
support from 2, 9, 36, 40, 64 and 66 sta­
tions, respectively. Of the 38 programs 
that were eventually purchased, 31 were 
. supported by more than half the stations 
in round 8. Five more received support 
from between 58 and 73 stations and two 
that were eventually purchased received 
only 40 and 42 votes in round 8. One of 
the latter was clearly a special case, con­
sisting of 100 sixty-second messages 
promoting coming attractions. Thus, of 
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the ten conventional programs rece1vmg 
support from between 36 and 73 stations, 
six were purchased. All six that were pur­
chased had total costs below $ 15,000 per 
program-hour, which is inexpensive. Of 
the four that were rejected, hourly cost 
data are available only for two. One was 
a children's program that cost $57,000 
per hour-more than triple the cost of 
"Sesame Street" or "The Electric Com­
pany"-and the other was a documentary 
series that cost more than $ 100,000 per 
hour. Thus, furthe� classification of pro-· 
· grams by cost apparently cleanly separates 
the purchased from the excluded programs. 
In both markets, the first few rounds 
saw massive reductions in the number of 
programs selected per station and gen­
erally rising program prices. In SPC I, 
prices for programs remaining in the 
market rose abruptly at" the start, and did 
not, on average, begin to fall until after 
the seventh round, while in SPC II, prices 
began to fall after round 3.2 In both 
markets, the average price of purchased 
programs did not return to the average 
round 1 initialization price until the last 
round. 
The first two SPCs appear to have 
reached an equilibrium, at least within 
the context of the operating rules. 
Although the twelve purchase rounds 
occurred over only a few days, late pur­
chases were possible for several weeks. 
Two programs in SPC I and seven in SPC 
II increased the number of stations sup­
porting them by 3 to 8 percent during the 
late purchases. In both markets about 55 
percent of the programs made no addi­
tional sales during the late purchase, 
while 28 percent in SPC I and 26 percent 
in SPC II increased their number of sup-
'This statement ·is true for both the unweighted 
average price and the average of prices weighted by 
the number of stations selecting the associated pro­
gram. Movements of the latter index the change in 
the average budget of a station, holding its. selections 
at the m.ean of all stations. 
porters by less than 2 percent. 
Outside the context of the SPC rules, 
the final list of programs purchased may 
not be an equilibrium. The key operating 
rule in the SPC appears to be the non­
reincarnation rule: once eliminated, a 
program cannot reenter the market at a 
later stage. This eliminates the possibility 
of cyclic selections, but may also prevent 
the system from reaching an efficient 
equilibrium if one exists. About one-third 
of the programs that eventually were 
purchased received twice or more as many 
votes in the final selection round as they 
did at their ebb during the market. Many 
of these programs also had mediocre pre­
market rating scores, averaging below a 
ranking of three in the five point scale. 
With the exception of buyer and seller 
guarantees as explained above, stations 
did not have an opportunity to price­
discriminate against themselves in order 
to register an intense preference for a 
particular program. A group of stations 
with an intense preference for a particular 
program, A, but unable to guarantee its 
purchase, could not offer remaining sta­
tions a discounted price to tempt them 
away from another program, B. If the 
remaining stations had only a slight pref­
erence for B over A, the pricing rule 
could prevent a substitution of A for B 
at prices that would make the move a 
.Pareto improvement. 
IV. Conclusions 
Because our research on the SPC has 
only begun, few conclusions can be drawn 
as yet. Most of the inferences we are pre­
pared to draw relate to the additional 
research that is required to gain a better 
understanding of how the system operates, 
if it could be adapted to the acquisition of 
other public goods (national parks, com­
mercial broadcasting, etc.), and whether 
it produces acceptable programming re­
sults at reasonable transactions cost. 
·-------------
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An obvious candidate for further work 
is theoretical examination of the equi­
librium properties of the SPC. Two types 
of questions are relevant: What norma­
tive properties, if any, do the existing 
SPC rules have, and would other initiali­
zation and updating procedures work 
better? Although of some interest is 
whether the system reaches an equilibrium 
that is Pareto optimal, for policy purposes 
the conclusion that it does not is not 
persuasive that the SPC should be 
abandoned. A centralized system, for 
reasons outlined briefly above, also is 
likely to be inefficient. Of prime practical 
interest are the consequences of alterna-. 
tive procedures for operating the system. 
Laboratory experiments could provide 
a useful additional source of information 
about alternative structures of SPC. Very 
briefly, the idea of each experiment would 
be to ask a group of subjects to select an 
unstated number of items from a list of 
alternatives. Total costs for each alter­
native would be provided, as well as a 
payoff function for each group member. 
An initialization and updating procedure 
would be adopted, and the general 
mechanics of the SPC followed. By run­
ning the identical experiment several 
times, the uniqueness of the results of the 
system could be checked. By varying pay­
off f �nctions while holding procedures 
fixed, the sensitivity of the system to 
intense preferences could be explored. 
And by varying procedures while holding 
payoffs constant, the performance of var­
ious initialization and updating methods 
-particularly of improvement algorithms 
and of other procedures-could be com­
pared. The advantage of the experimental 
system, of course, is that it is far less 
expensive-in terms of operating costs, 
risks to something of significant value 
(the public television system), and the 
time between observations-than, through 
the years, manipulating the SPC. 
Finally, the overriding conclusion of 
our investigations to date is that experi­
mental markets for public goods are an 
interesting, potentially useful and almost 
completely unexplored focus for research. 
If this paper conveys to other social 
scientists our perception of the fascinating 
possibilities suggested by the SPC, its 
most important purpose will have been 
served. 
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